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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
We currently live in a world increasingly reliant on technological inno-
vation where the innovation of one entity is often improved upon and ad-
vanced by the improvements and ingenuity of another. Where earlier
innovations are protected by patents, the innovators of later improvements
must design around the claims of the previous patents or seek licenses from
the owners of the previous patents in order to lawfully make improvements.
In this way, innovators can protect their inventions, and the public is en-
riched by a disclosure that enables others to make and use at least one ver-
sion of the invention. In turn, this encourages further innovation.
The origins of the rights of patent holders can be traced to Article 1,
section 8, clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, which endeavors "to promote the
progress of . .. useful arts by securing for a limited times to . . . inventors the
exclusive rights to their . . . discoveries."' Under current patent law, the
owner of a U.S. patent is granted the right to exclude others from making,
using, selling, offering to sell, or importing all configurations of products that
are within the claim language.2 If these rights are violated, the patent owner
can sue for infringement.3 In response, an alleged infringer will most often
attempt to invalidate the patent.4 The alleged infringer may also assert af-
firmative defenses to the infringement claim.5
One of these defenses is that the asserted making, using, etc., was for
purely experimental purposes, and should not count as an act of infringement
for that reason. Whether this is a valid defense in law is the subject of this
paper. The patent statute does not address this issue, except in the case of
experiments for purposes of FDA approval.6 A more general exemption has
been the subject of great debate, and recent case law calls the general exemp-
tion into question. One such case is Madey v. Duke, decided by the Federal
Circuit in 2002. The court ruled that a university's use of a patented machine
for experimentation was still a commercial use, and therefore, not exempt
from an infringement claim.7 Another opinion, Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v.
1. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
2. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000).
3. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)-(b).
4. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-03.
5. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 102-03 (2000) (various ways to invalidate a patent).
There are numerous other affirmative defenses employed as well.
6. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
7. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1361-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied,
539 U.S. 958 (2003).
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Merck KGaA, found a pharmaceutical company's use of an amino acid se-
quence within the expressed experimental use exemptions of 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(1), even though the use could be characterized as commercial.8
Since the early 1800s, the recognition of experimental use as a defense
to patent infringement has continually evolved, allowing the defense for non-
profit uses, characterizing such uses as de minimis, not recognizing the de-
fense at all, or immunizing certain types of industry-specific experimental
use by statute. In order to better understand recent experimental use hold-
ings, a comprehensive review of common law experimental use and statutory
interpretations of the 271(e) (1) experimental use exemption is necessary.
II. EXPERIMENTAL USE DEFENSE BEFORE ROCHE V. BOLAR
The right-granting provisions of the Patent Act of 1793 and the Patent
Act of 1836 granted the patentee the full and exclusive right and liberty of
"making, using, and vending" his patented invention.9 While patents no
longer confer any rights to make or use anything, the words "making" and
"using" have survived in the current patent law as actions a patentee can
prevent others from doing.IO
a. Actual Profit Infringement
Whittemore v. Cutter is credited with first recognizing the experimental
use defense to patent infringement."' In the original suit, the court entered
judgment for the plaintiff against the defendant's use of a patented machine
that produced playing cards.12 The defendant moved for a new trial, in part
because of his objections to jury instructions that stated "making of a ma-
chine fit for use, and with a design to use it for profit" constituted infringe-
ment.13 Justice Story noted "it could never have been the intention of the
legislature to punish a man, who constructed such a machine merely for phil-
osophical experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of
the machine to produce its described effects."14 Thus, the common law ex-
perimental use exception to patent infringement was born.
In Sawin v. Guild, the plaintiff held a patent on a machine for cutting
brad nails. The deputy sheriff executed, seized and sold three such machines
8. See generally Integra Lifesciences 1, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed.
Cir. 2003), vacated and remanded, 545 U.S. 193, 208 (2005).
9. Patent Act, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109-12 (1790).
10. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1).
11. See Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600).
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in satisfaction of the then substantial debt of $567.27.15 The plaintiff sued
the deputy sheriff for infringement arising from the sale of his patented ma-
chines. Relying on the April 17, 1800, revision of the Patent Act of 1790, the
plaintiff declared that "any person, without consent of the patentee . . . first
obtained in writing, shall make, devise, use, or sell the thing, whereof the
exclusive right is secured to the said patentee, such person, so offending,
shall forfeit [the thing]."16 Justice Story expressed a policy concern that a
party might be able to "lock up his whole property, however great, from the
grasp of his creditors, by investing it in profitable patented machines."7
Story cited Whittemore as holding that "the making of a patented machine
. . . must be the making with an intent to use for profit, and not for the mere
purpose of philosophical experiment, or to ascertain the verity and exactness
of the specification."1 However, Justice Story's view leaves open uses that
are experimental in the near term, but intended for profit in the long term.
In Byam v. Bullard, Justice Curtis, besides expressing doubt regarding
the experimental use theory, interpreted both Whittemore and Sawin as re-
quiring plaintiff to show "injury and damage."'9 This case also held that a
sale to an agent of the patent owner was not an infringement because a sale to
an agent would not deprive the patent owner of "the lawful rewards of his
discovery," as stated in Sawin.20
In Poppenhusen v. New York Gutta Percha Comb Co., the defendant
used the plaintiff's patented process to produce smooth and glossy surfaces
on vulcanized rubber articles placed into the commercial market. The court
instructed the jury that patent infringement occurs, and the experimental use
doctrine is inapplicable, when "done as a matter of business, where the prod-
uct of the experiment has been thrown into the market, to compete with the
products of the plaintiff, although he may call it an experiment . . . ."21 Here,
as in Sawin, even though the facts of the case indicate profit, the holding
does not expressly require profit to find infringement.22
15. Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. CAS. 554, 554 (C.C.D. MASS. 1813) (No. 12,391).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 554-55.
18. Id. at 555.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. Poppenhusen v. New York Gutta Percha Comb Co., 19 F. Cas. 1059, 1063
(C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1858) (No. 11,283).
22. See Sawin, 21 F. CAs. at 555.
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b. Possibility of Profit Infringement
In Poppenhausen v. Falke,23 the court stated that it was "now well-set-
tied that an experiment with a patented article for the sole purpose of gratify-
ing a philosophical taste, or curiosity, or for mere amusement is not an
infringement of the rights of the patentee."24 This holding also reinforces the
notion that experimentation performed by commercial entities for long-term
profit can constitute an infringement.
In Albright v. Celluloid Harness-Trimming Co.,25 the defendant aban-
doned experiments to perfect the manufacture of metal harness-trimmings
coated with celluloid with plaintiff's patented die. The court held that the
use was a technical infringement and sufficient to authorize an injunction,
even though it found neither damages incurred by plaintiff, nor profits in-
curred by defendant.26 This is in contrast with Justice Curtis's theory in
Byam v. Bullard, that no action would lie except where "injury and damage"
were shown.27
In Palmer v. United States,28 the Army manufactured 10,500 sets of the
plaintiff's patented knapsack, but found them unsatisfactory and never put
them to "the test of actual use." The court stated that the government had no
right to make such a "huge experiment" and found it to be an act of patent
infringement.29
In Beedle v. Bennett, the Supreme Court held that a family's use of a
patented well on their property solely for personal convenience was an act of
patent infringement.30 This case leaves a question of whether using another's
patent to fulfill a physiological need, as opposed to philosophical taste, con-
stitutes patent infringement.3' A physiological need requires some expendi-
ture and a use of a patented invention and to avoid that expenditure would be
denying the patent owner the lawful rewards of their discovery.32
23. Poppenhausen v. Falke, 19 F. CAS. 1048, 1049 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1861) (No.
11,279).
24. Id.
25. Albright v. Celluloid Harness-Trimming Co., I F. Cas. 320, 320 (C.C.N.J.
1877) (No. 147).
26. Id. at 323.
27. Byam v. Bullard, 4 F. Cas. 934, 935 (C.C.D. Mass. 1852) (No. 2,262).
28. Palmer v. United States, 20 Ct. Cl. 432 (1885), affid, 128 U.S. 262 (1888).
29. Id. at 437.




SMU Science and Technology Law Review
c. Robinson on Patents 1890
Professor Robinson's famous 1890 treatise, The Law of Patents for Use-
ful Inventions, firmly entrenched the experimental use exception into patent
law when he wrote:
The interest of the patentee is represented by the emoluments
which he does or might receive from the practice of the invention
by himself or others. These, though not always taking the shape
of money, are of a pecuniary character, and their value is capable
of estimation like other property. Hence acts of infringement
must attack the right of the patentee to these emoluments, and
either turn them aside into other channels or prevent them from
accruing in favor of any one . . . the manufacture or the use of the
invention may be intended only for other purposes, and produce
no pecuniary result. Thus where it is made or used as an experi-
ment, whether for the gratification of scientific tastes, or for curi-
osity, or for amusement, the interests of the patentee are not
antagonized, the sole effect being of an intellectual character in
the promotion of the employer's knowledge or the relaxation af-
forded to his mind.33
Robinson distinguishes experimental use from infringing use by consid-
ering whether the pecuniary interest of the patent owner is affected, and
whether an accused infringer would be required to make a profit to constitute
infringement.34 Robinson defines experimental use as those that gratify sci-
entific tastes, curiosity or amusement. 35 However, Robinson continues:
"But if the products of the experiment are sold, or used for the
convenience of the experimentor, or if the experiments are con-
ducted with a view to the adaptation of the invention to the experi-
mentor's business, the acts of making or of use are violations of
the rights of the inventor and infringements of his patent. In refer-
ence to such employments of a patented invention the law is dili-
gent to protect the patentee, and even experimental uses will be
sometimes enjoined though no injury may have resulted admitting
of positive redress."36
According to Professor Robinson, commercial use in the course of busi-
ness for profit or for convenience of a patented invention constituted in-
33. 3 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS
§ 898 (Vol. 3 1890).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. (emphases added).
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fringement by 1890.37 In addition, Robinson recognized that damages were
appropriate for infringement, even when it "results in no particular injury to
the plaintiff, the commission of the wrong entitles him to some recovery in
vindication of his invaded rights."38
d. In the Course of Business Infringement
In Bonsack Mach. Co. v. Underwood, defendant constructed a patented
cigarette making machine to demonstrate the usefulness of his own patented
improvement.39 This was done for the purpose of selling his patent.40 The
court opined that "to constitute an infringement, the making must be with an
intent to use for profit, and not for the mere purpose of a philosophical exper-
iment."41 The basis for the alleged infringement stemmed from defendant's
use of the patented machine to sell his own patent, gave an option to sell the
machine, and helped organize a company to manufacture products with the
machine: "A bill will lie for an injunction upon well-grounded proof of the
intention to violate the patent right."42 This holding is consistent with Robin-
son's theory that a patent is infringed when experiments are conducted with a
view to the adaptation of the invention to the experimenter's business.43
In Clerk v. Tannage Patent Co., defendants claimed their nine-month
use of plaintiff's patented process for tanning skins and hides was experi-
mental and conducted to determine the patented process's utility.44 In addi-
tion, the defendants claimed that the patented process had been publicly
offered for license and therefore, they had special permission to make rea-
sonable experiments and trials.45 The Third Circuit affirmed a preliminary
injunction to restrain infringement and held that in the absence of actual per-
mission, even the expression of a willingness by the patent owner to sell a
license under the patent did not confer a privilege to experimentally test.46
In Cimiotti Unhairing Co. v. Derboklow, the defendant used two pat-
ented machines for dehairing pelts for nearly three years, while claiming that
he was only "experimenting . . . to see if he could not discover some im-
provement" that would be more effective.47 The court rejected this argument
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Bonsack Mach. Co. v. Underwood, 73 F. 206, 209 (C.C.N.C. 1896).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 211.
42. Id. at 211.
43. See RoBINsoN, supra note 33, at § 898.
44. Clerk v. Tannage Patent. Co., 84 F. 643, 643-44 (3d Cir. 1898).
45. Id. at 644.
46. Id.
47. Cimotti Unhairing Co. v. Derboklow, 87 F. 997, 999 (E.D.N.Y. 1898).
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because the defendant dehaired pelts for customers in the ordinary course of
business-a practice that "is not fairly within any legitimate use for experi-
mental purposes only."48 Similar to Clerk, the use involved here was blatant
prolonged commercial use and the products were actually sold for profit.
In United States Mitis Co. v. Carnegie Steel Co., the defendant used a
patented steel making process to manufacture 2,769 tons of armor plate from
ingots for a period of three to four months.49 The court rejected the defen-
dant's argument of experimental use, holding that "was a commercial use,
extending over a period of several months and involved a very large product.
It was in the course of business and for profit."50 By the turn of the century,
the court looked not only at the type of use, such as commercial or scientific,
but also the duration of use. Courts have consistently held that to avoid in-
fringement, a purported experimental use must be brief.
The court in Thompson v. Bushnell Co. held that an infringer's purpose
and intent are immaterial to determine the question of infringement.5' This
decision is contrary to Whittemore's "with a design to use it for profit" defi-
nition of infringing use and Sawin's "making with an intent to use for profit"
caveat that constitutes infringing use.52 It is also contrary to the rationale
expressed by Robinson; there, the court considered whether the alleged in-
fringer conducted experiments with a view to the adaptation of the invention
to the experimentor's business. These criteria look directly to purpose and
intent to determine if experimental use is infringing.
National Meter Co. v. Thomson Meter Co. held that intent was a rele-
vant factor.51 The defendant made six water meters covered by Plaintiff's
patent and sold one to Plaintiff.54 The defendant argued that the sale was
accidental, and moreover was "not employed for beneficial uses of a pecuni-
ary character," but were assembled for test purposes.55 The court found suf-
ficient evidence of threatened infringement and held that the defendant's
actions constituted infringement.56 Since the court found sufficient intent, it
declined to decide whether the tests and single sale constituted actual in-
48. Id.
49. U.S. Mitis Co. v. Carnegie Steel Co., 89 F. 343, 346 (C.C.W.D. Penn. 1898),
affd without opinion, 90 F. 829 (3d Cir. 1898).
50. Id. at 351.
51. See generally Thompson v. Bushnell Co., 96 F. 238 (2d Cir. 1899).
52. Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (1813); Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas.
554, 555 (1813).
53. Nat'l Meter Co. v. Thomson Meter Co., 106 F. 531, 541-42 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1900).
54. Id. at 541.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 541-42.
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fringement.57 Evidently, Thompson v. Busnell was not followed in this
decision.
In Dowagiac Mfg. Corp. v. Minnesota Moline Plow Co., the court held
that a patentee may be substantially injured because he has failed to collect at
least a reasonable royalty, a just and deserved gain.58 While the court did not
provide a strong holding in regard to experimental use, the rationale is con-
sistent with Sawin, where the court proposed that a patentee should not be
deprived of "the lawful rewards of his discovery," if lawful rewards are inter-
preted to include all the benefits that imbued with patent exclusivity mone-
tary and otherwise.59
In Pairpearl Products, Inc. v. Joseph H. Meyer Bros., the defendant,
purportedly for the purposes of experimentation, used a process of extracting
pearl essence which was covered by plaintiffs patent.60 In addition, the de-
fendants also claimed to have discovered a new agent used in its commercial
process but refused to disclose the new agent's composition at trial. The
court found infringement, holding that the use was "large enough to be in-
cluded in any accounting" and the defendants sold the resulting pearl essence
"into commerce through the usual channels."61
Kansas City Southern Ry Co. v. Silica Products held that an infringer's
purpose and intent are immaterial when determining the question of infringe-
ment. 62 This holding is similar to Thompson. The court was likely reem-
phasizing the Thompson holding because intervening decisions addressing
experimental use infringement seem to completely ignore Thompson in their
decisions.
In United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp, the court held that patent
infringement is not a common law tort, but rather a creature of statute and
should be governed by statute.63 This decision rejects the common law con-
cept of experimental use as first recognized in Whittemore. Implicit in this
decision is the proposition that exceptions to patent infringement must first
be defined by Congress and then interpreted by the courts.
e. Contributory Infringement
In Ruth v. Stearns-Roger Mfg. Co., the defendant manufactured mining
and milling machinery, resulting in a lawsuit for contributory infringement
57. Id. at 542.
58. Dowagiac Mfg. Corp. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1915).
59. Sawin, 21 F. Cas. 554, 555.
60. Pairpearl Prods., Inc. v. Joseph H. Meyer Bros., 58 F.2d 802, 802-04 (D. Me.
1932), modified on other grounds, 62 F.2d 668 (1st Cir. 1932).
61. Id. at 804.
62. Kan. City S. Ry. Co. v. Silica Prods., 48 F.2d 503, 508 (8th Cir. 1931), cert.
denied, 284 U.S. 626 (1931).
63. United States v. Dublier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 198-99 (1933).
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because a purchaser continued infringement by using the products.64 Today a
purchaser would be exempt from a claim of contributory infringement.65 The
case involved two patented floatation machines and replacement parts sold to
the Colorado School of Mines and used in its laboratory for experimental
purposes. 66 The court held that, while the original sale to the School was an
infringement, the sale of the recovery parts was not. 67 Furthermore, the court
held that the "making or using of a patented invention merely for experimen-
tal purposes, without any intent to derive profits or practical advantage there-
from, is not infringement," but the sale of similar parts to other parties would
be an infringement.68 This case appears to suggest that the court did not view
uses in a university laboratory as commercial and, therefore, within the ex-
perimental use exception. In addition, by today's standards, since the univer-
sity was not directly infringing, the parts supplier could not be held liable for
contributing to infringement.69
f. Commercial Use Continues to Infringe
Duplate Corp. v. Triplex Safety Glass Co. dealt with the infringement of
Duplate's laminated glass.70 Although experimental use was not the focus of
the case, the court suggested that a patentee may be substantially injured if he
has failed to acquire the collection of at least a reasonable royalty.7' This is
still in accordance with Sawin's lawful reward theory.72
64. Ruth v. Steams-Rogers Mfg. Co., 13 F. Supp. 697, 699 (D. Colo. 1935), rev'd
on other grounds, 87 F.2d 35 (10th Cir. 1936).
65. Today this activity would not be labeled "contributory infringement." 35
U.S.C. § 271(c) (2003) provides: "Whoever . .. imports into the United States
a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or composition,
or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting
a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or
especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple
article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use,
shall be liable as a contributory infringer."
66. Ruth, 13 F. Supp. at 699, 703.
67. Id. at 713.
68. Id.
69. "[I]t is settled that if there is no direct infringement of a patent there can be no
contributory infringement." Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement
Co., 365 U.S. 336, 341 (1961).
70. Duplate Corp. v. Triplex Safety Glass Co., 298 U.S. 448 (1936), superseded by
statute, 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000), as recognized in, Gen. Motors Corp. v. Devex
Corp., 461 U.S. 648 (1983).
71. Id. at 457.
72. See Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554, 614 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813).
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In RCA v. Andrea, even though the defendant attempted to circumvent
the plaintiff's patent by separating component parts within a single package
before shipping, the court held that "sell[ing] all the elements of the com-
pleted patented combination" and combining components for testing prior to
shipping was not experimental but commercial, and therefore infringement.73
If tests were made to determine whether the parts were marketable or not, it
is considered commercial, and therefore, infringing use. 74
g. The United States Infringes
In Ordnance Engineering Corp. v. United States, the court found that
the manufacturing of shells covered by the plaintiffs patent was an infringe-
ment of that patent by the United States Navy Department. 75 However, the
government was allowed to exclude 7,425 shells built for experimental pur-
poses from the total number of shells the court found infringed on the plain-
tiff's patent; the court noted without citation that "experimental shells are
shells built for experimental purposes."76
h. Profit Again Required to Infringe
In Akro Agate Co. v. Master Marble Co., during the course of research
and development of a marble-making machine, the defendant experimented
with a mechanism covered by the plaintiffs patent.77 However, the defen-
dant was unsatisfied with the results and abandoned the patented mechanism
in favor of another method. The court held "[t]hat the experimental testing
... for a brief period before going into commercial production . . . was not in
law an act of infringement as marbles were not commercially sold."78 This
seems to support the proposition that commercially motivated experimental
uses must be brief to avoid a finding of infringement.
i. Sales Demonstration Infringing
Sprout, Waldron & Co. v. Bauer Bros. Co. involved a defendant whose
operation of manufactured machines infringed upon the plaintiffs patented
manufacturing process.79 Defendant kept the machines at a sales-demonstra-
73. RCA v. Andrea, 90 F.2d 612, 614 (2d Cir. 1937).
74. Id. at 614 (citing Cimiotte Unhairing Co. v. Derboklow, 87 F. 997 (C.C.N.Y.
1898)).
75. Ordnance Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 84 Ct. Cl. 1 (1936), cert. denied, 302
U.S. 708 (1937).
76. Id. at 1.
77. Akro Agate Co. v. Master Marble Co., 18 F. Supp. 305, 315 (N.D. W. Va.
1937).
78. Id. at 333 (citing Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813)).
79. Sprout, Waldron & Co. v. Bauer Bros. Co. 26 F. Supp. 162, 165 (S.D. Ohio
1938).
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tion laboratory and used them to make wood pulp and wall board for some of
his customers.80 Although the defendant did not claim experimental use as a
defense, the court offered that "[t]he defendant cannot escape on the ground
of experimental use where the machines were used to operate upon custom-
ers' products in the ordinary course of business."81
j. Design and Manufacturing Infringing Use
In Northill Co. v. Danforth, the defendant designed an anchor covered
by plaintiff's patent.82 Defendant had the anchors produced by various foun-
dries and commercially sold them almost exclusively "to the Federal Govern-
ment for use by the Army, Navy and Coast Guard."83 The defendant argued
experimental use, claiming he only designed the anchor, and that an action of
infringement would fail because there were "no civilian sales to make a
prima facie case."84 The court rejected the defendant's experimental use de-
fense, observing that the "defendant's experiments were evidently not made
for philosophical or amusement purposes but were made in connection with
his business as a manufacturer and salesman of anchors."85
k. A Prototype Seen as Experiment
In Dugan v. Lear Avia, Inc., the defendant made radio direction-finding
and position-indicating systems covered by plaintiffs patent.86 The court
"eliminated from consideration" defendant's prototype device because "it af-
firmatively appeared . . . that defendant built that device only experimentally
and that it ha[d] neither manufactured it for sale nor sold any."87 This case
seems to stand for the proposition that experiments are permissible, even if
ultimately commercially motivated.
III. STATUTORY RECOGNITION OF EXPERIMENTAL USE
a. Atomic Energy Act of 1946
The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 authorized experimental and research
activity by the newly created Atomic Energy Commission:
80. Id. at 165, 168-69.
81. Id. at 169.
82. Northill Co. v. Danforth, 51 F. Supp. 928, 929 (N.D. Cal. 1942), modified on




86. Dugan v. Lear Avia, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 223, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 1944), affd, 156
F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1946).
87. Id. at 229 (citing Bonsack Mach. Co. v. Underwood, 73 F. 206, 211 (C.C.N.C.
1896)).
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for the conduct of research and developmental activities relating
to 1) nuclear processes; 2) the theory and production of atomic
energy, including processes and devices related to such produc-
tion; 3) utilization of fissionable and radioactive materials for
medical, biological, health, or military purposes; 4) utilization of
fissionable and radioactive materials . . . for all other purposes,
including industrial uses; and 5) the protection of health during
research and production activities.88
Additionally the Act encouraged experimental activity by the Atomic
Energy Commission for studies of the social, political, and economic effects
of the availability and utilization of atomic energy.89 No case law is availa-
ble to challenge the 1946 experimental authorizations. Therefore, in order to
have experimental use recognized, industry-specific legislation had to be
introduced.
b. Patent Act of 1952
An act of Congress approved July 19, 1952, effective January 1, 1953,
substantially revised and codified patent laws into their present form.90
Under § 154 of the Patent Act of 1952, which defines the rights conferred by
a patent, the previous language was changed to "the right to exclude others
from making, using, or selling the invention" in order to coincide with prior
case law.91 This aligned the statute with the Supreme Court, which stated
"all that the government conferred by the patent was the right to exclude
others from making, using, or vending his invention."92
When Congress enacted the current revision of the patent laws, a statu-
tory definition of patent infringement existed for the first time since the 1836
repeal of § 5 of the Patent Act of 1793.93 Section 154 gives a patentee the
right, inter alia, "to exclude others from making, using, or selling" a patented
88. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755, 758 (1946).
89. Id. at 755.
90. Patent Act of 1952, ch. 905, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 35 U.S.C.).
91. Id. at 804.
92. Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works, 261 U.S. 24, 35 (1923)
(citing Cont'l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908). Also
note that the scope of a patent claim might be wholly within the scope of an
earlier unexpired patent claim; hence the recipient of the later claim could not
practice any subject matter within his claim, except by permission of the holder
of the broader claim. For example, a claim might recite the combination of A-
B-C, but B might have been the subject of an earlier unexpired patent. The
holder of the A-B-C claim is blocked from practicing that combination without
the assent of the B patentee.
93. See 66 Stat. at 792.
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invention.94 Section 271(a) of the code defined infringement as "whoever
without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention,
within the United States or imports into the United States any patented inven-
tion during the term of the patent therefore, infringes the patent."95 The Pat-
ent Act of 1952 made no statutory exemptions for experimental use;
however, it did provide that damages shall be "in no event less than a reason-
able royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer."96
c. Atomic Energy Act of 1954
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 eliminated the experimental exemption
contained in the 1946 version of that act for research activity relating to
atomic energy.97 By 1954, there was no statutory recognition, either general
or industry-specific, of the experimental use defense to patent infringement
by private parties.98
IV. EXPERIMENTAL USE BRIEFLY RESURRECTED
a. Royalty-Free Experimental Use Recognized for United States
The United States was recognized as a royalty-free experimental user in
Chesterfield v. United States.99 The patent holder of a metal alloy sued the
United States for compensation from the government's use of the patent.
The Court of Claims held that although the government used 3,679 pounds of
the alloy, there was no liability to the patent holder because "the evidence
shows that a portion of the . .. alloy procured by the defendant was used only
for testing and for experimental purposes, and there was no evidence that the
remainder was used other than experimentally."oo What remained to be seen
was if an experimental use could be recognized in the private sector as well.
94. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2002).
95. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). Also note that 35 U.S.C. § 283 states that "the several
courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant injunctions in ac-
cordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right
secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable."
96. 35 U.S.C. § 284.
97. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2181-90.
98. The immunity provided to the U.S. government by 28 U.S.C. § 1498 would
also apply to government contractors if two criteria are met: (1) the use is "for
the Government"; and (2) the Government gives "its authorization or consent"
for the use. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 534 F.2d 889, 897-98 (Ct.
Cl. 1976). The government cannot be enjoined from infringing a patent, but it
may have to pay compensation for doing so. But this minimal liability can
disappear, as shown in the next section.
99. See Chesterfield v. United States, 159 F. Supp. 371, 375 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
100. Id.
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b. Private Sector Experimental Use
In Kaz Manufacturing v. Chesebrough-Ponds, Inc., the defendant cre-
ated a hybrid steam vaporizer from a number of the plaintiffs patented ma-
chines and used it in a television commercial for the defendant's competing
aerosol product. o The Second Circuit affirmed a lower court finding of no
infringement and held that the purpose of an accused making or use "may
determine whether the construction constitutes an infringement of the paten-
tee's rights."02 In terms of experimental use, this could be interpreted as
Whittemore dicta in that "it could never have been the intention of the legis-
lature to punish a man, who constructed such a machine merely for philo-
sophical experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the
machine to produce its described effects."03 In terms of the use in advertis-
ing, Robinson's treatise explains that "where it is made or used as an experi-
ment, whether for the gratification of scientific tastes, or for curiosity, or for
amusement, the interests of the patentee are not antagonized, the sole effect
being of an intellectual character in the promotion of the employer's knowl-
edge or the relaxation afforded to his mind."104
V. COMMERCIAL USE STILL INFRINGING
In Spray Refrigeration Co. v. Sea Spray Fishing, Inc., the defendant
used the plaintiff's patented method for freezing fish onboard a vessel at sea
on one or two fishing voyages. 05 The defendant contended that the use was
"only for the purpose of experimentation as to the desirability of using this
method" and found that satisfactory results could be obtained without using
the process.I0 6 The Ninth Circuit found that the defendant had infringed,
distinguishing earlier holdings in Chesterfield and Dugan, noting that "in
neither of those cases was the experimental use coupled with a commercial
use."o107 This decision accords with Whittemore's "with a design to use it for
profit" definition of infringing use and Sawin's "making with an intent to use
for profit."108 It is also in line with Professor Robinson's treatise in that "if
101. Kaz Mfg. v. Chesebrough-Ponds, Inc., 317 F.2d 679 (2d Cir. 1963).
102. Id. at 680.
103. Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813).
104. 3 WILLIAM C. ROBINsON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS
§ 898 at 56 (1890) (emphasis added).




108. Whittemore, 21 F. Cas. at 1121; Sawin, 21 F. Cas. at 555.
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the products of the experiment are sold . . . the acts of making or of use are
violations of the rights of the inventor and infringements of his patent."109
The courts in both Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replace-
ment Co. and Coakwell v. United States held that it was established law that
the use of a patented invention, without either manufacture or sale, is action-
able. 1o Thus, the patentee does not need to have any evidence of damage or
lost sales to bring an infringement action.
VI. DE MINIMIS EXPERIMENTAL USE NOT INFRINGING
In Finney v. United States, the holder of a patented glove sued the
United States for infringement.' The defendant admitted using the patented
glove in conjunction with an interlocking handle in an experiment with a
NASA astronaut.1 2 The trial judge of the Court of Claims denied a motion
by the government for summary judgment of noninfringement, ruling that
"whether or not NASA's allegedly single use was an experimental one, is a
question of fact that can only be resolved after a trial on the merits."' 13 The
judge at trial found that the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex (the law is
not concerned with trifles) applied.Il4 The case supports the doctrine that
experimental use is de minimis use. This may have been how Justice Curtis
was interpreting Whittemore and Sawin in his Byam v. Bullard opinion based
on the principle that no action would lie except where "injury and damage"
were shown." 1S
In Douglas v. United States, the United States bought six airplanes and
eleven replacement engines covered by the plaintiff's patents, and the Army,
Navy, Air Force and NASA used them over a four-year period.116 The trial
judge reviewed the prior cases on experimental use and noted "the defense is
nothing more than an expression of the maxim de minimis non curat lex.""l?
Federal courts have found that the use of accused devices is not experimental
when the defendants have never been authorized to use the patent holder's
devices for their own purposes and interests, especially if "there was a pat-
tern of systematic exploitation, extending over a prolonged period" along
with an absence of the use simply being "for amusement, to satisfy idle curi-
109. 3 ROBINsoN, supra note 93, at 56.
110. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 484
(1964); Coakwell v. United States, 372 F.2d 508, 510 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
111. Finney v. United States, 178 U.S.P.Q. 235, 235-36 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
112. See id. at 236.
113. Id. at 237.
114. Finney v. United States, 188 U.S.P.Q. 33, 35 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
115. Byam v. Bullard, 4 F. Cas. 934, 935 (C.C.D. Mass. 1852).
116. Douglas v. United States, 181 U.S.P.Q. 170, 177 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
117. Id.
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osity, or for philosophical inquiry."I18 But in Douglas v. United States, the
Court of Claims subsequently affirmed in favor of the defendant solely on
invalidity grounds.''9 This decision further supports a separate doctrine of
experimental use as de minimis use, and possible determining factors drawn
from this case include: 1) pattern of use, 2) length of period of use, 3) amount
used, and 4) purpose of use.120
In Pitcairn v. United States, the defendant United States manufactured
seven models of helicopters, and the court agreed with the claims of infringe-
ment on eleven of the plaintiff's patents.'12 Although the defendant urged the
court "to exclude from compensation any aircraft used by the defendant for
testing, evaluational, demonstrational or experimental purposes," the trial
judge held that "[t]ests, demonstrations, and experiments of such nature are
intended uses of the infringing aircraft manufactured for the defendant and
are in keeping with the legitimate business of the using agency. Experimen-
tal use is not a defense in the present litigation."122
The judge relied on Douglas and distinguished Chesterfield-in that
case, the government "procured by purchase, not by manufacture."'23 This
decision also accords with Whittemore's "with a design to use it for profit"
definition of infringing use and Sawin's "making with an intent to use for
profit."124 It is also in line with Professor Robinson's view that if "used for
the convenience of the experimentor, or if the experiments are conducted
with a view to the adaptation of the invention to the experimentor's business
the acts of making or of use are violations of the rights of the inventor and
infringements of his patent."125
VII. SUMMARY PRE-1984 COMMON LAw EXPERIMENTAL
USE DEFENSE
Commercialism and intent to profit seem to be the deciding factors. The
experimental use exemption is only allowed by industry-specific statutorily
defined exemptions, or if the use is considered de minimis.
118. Id.
119. Douglas v. United States, 510 F.2d 364 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
120. See Douglas, 181 U.S.P.Q. at 177.
121. Pitcairn v. United States, 188 U.S.P.Q. 35, 46-47 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
122. Id. at 47.
123. Pitcairn v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106, 1125 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
124. Whittemore, 21 F. Cas. at 1121; Sawin, 21 F. Cas. at 555.
125. 3 ROBINSON, supra note 98, at 56 (emphasis added).
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VIII. ROCHE PRODUCTS, INC v. BOLAR PHARMACEUTICAL CO, INC.
(FED. CIR. 1984)
a. Roche
In Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., the plaintiff held
a patent on flurazepam hydrochloride, the active ingredient in its prescription
Dalmane sleeping pill.126 The defendant, Bolar, used flurazepam hydrochlo-
ride to perform tests that were needed to obtain Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA) approval for Bolar's generic version prior to the plaintiff's patent
expiration on January 17, 1984.127 The district court held that there was no
infringement because the use was de minimis and experimental; therefore, the
district court was in line with the pre-1984 court decisions dealing with ex-
perimental use.128 However, the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that even
if Bolar's use was for the sole purpose of conducting tests and developing
information necessary to apply for regulatory approval, it was "solely for
business reasons and not for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for
strictly philosophical inquiry."29 Since there was "a violation of the rights of
the patentee to exclude others from using his patented invention," the Federal
Circuit held that the Court of Claims precedents such as Pitcairn were
controlling. 130
b. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)
The problem with the Roche decision is that the combined effect of the
patent law and the FDA regulatory approval requirements effectively ex-
tended the patent term.131 In response, Congress immediately passed the
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, also
known as the Hatch-Waxman Act.132 Section 202 of this legislation enacted
35 U.S.C § 271(e)(1), providing that making, using, or selling, and offering
to sell or importing of "a patented invention," was not an act of infringement
if the act be "solely for uses reasonably related to the development and sub-
mission of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture,
use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products."133 As with the
Atomic Energy Act of 1946, industry specific legislation had to be intro-
126. Roche Prod., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 860 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
127. Id.
128. See id. at 861.
129. Id. at 863.
130. Id.
131. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 670 (1990).
132. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000)) (referred to as the HATCH-WAXMAN ACT
because of the two primary sponsors, Senator Orrin Hatch (R- UT) and Con-
gressman Henry Waxman (D-CA)).
133. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e).
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duced in order to define certain specific experimental use exemptions to pat-
ent infringement. Unlike the 1946 act, litigation proliferated relating to the
§ 271(e) experimental exemption.
The first case, Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., involved the question
of whether the § 27 1 (e)( I) exemption applied literally, that is, to experiments
needed for regulatory approval under a statute regulating drugs, even if the
item in question was not itself a drug. In the instant case it was a medical
device-an implantable defibrillator.134 The appeals court held that the ex-
emption was not limited to drugs, but extends to medical devices that are
likewise subject to Food and Drug Administration approval under the Food
Drug and Cosmetic Act, which also regulates drugs.135 The Supreme Court
affirmed, with Justice Scalia noting that "[t]he phrase 'patented invention' in
§ 271(e)(1) is defined to include all inventions where regulatory approval is
needed pursuant to the statute, not drug-related inventions alone."36
c. Possibility of Commercialism Still Infringing with § 271(e)(1)
In Deuterium Corp. v. United States, the situation involved only case-
law doctrine and did not involve FDA approvals.137 During a 120-hour test
run at a "pilot" plant, a government contractor tested its steam cleaning pro-
cess to remove hydrogen sulfide from geothermal steam. The Claims Court
held that the experimental use exception was not applicable because the pilot
had none of "the hallmarks of an experiment conducted for curiosity, amuse-
ment, or intellectual stimulation."138 Instead, "any experimentation moti-
vated by curiosity, amusement, or general intellectual inquiry took place long
before creation of the detailed and expensive proposal for a pilot project."I39
Further, the court stated that "if fully successful, the pilot could have paved
the way for broader commercial applications," and concluded by noting that
for a brief period of time, steam processed at the facility generated commer-
cial electricity.140 The Claims Court noted that, although Congress narrowed
application of the doctrine affecting reporting requirements for federal drug
laws, Congress did not disturb the Federal Circuit's enunciation of the pa-
rameters of the experimental use exception.141
134. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 872 F.2d 402, 404 (Fed. Cir. 1989), reh'g
denied, 879 F.2d 849, aff'd, 496 U.S. 661.
135. Id. at 406.
136. Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 665.
137. See Deuterium Corp. v. United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 624 (1990).
138. Id. at 634.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 634.
141. Id. at 632, n.14.
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d. § 271(e)(1) Exemption Broadened
In Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., the Northern District of California
held that any commercial uses that went beyond what § 271(e)(1) protects,
such as trade show demonstrations and demonstrations to persons who were
not screened for eligibility, were de minimis.142 The court noted that 1) a
patentee may not eliminate the § 271(e)(1) exemption merely by showing
that the accused manufacturer "intends to commercialize the device before
the expiration of the allegedly infringed patent,"143 and 2) the § 271(e)(1)
exemption "is not lost simply as a result of a showing that the [accused in-
fringer] has engaged in non-infringing acts whose 'uses' fall outside those
permitted by the statute."'44 The district court further held that a court should
not allow a patentee to pursue a patent validity and infringement declaratory
judgment suit against a party whose current activity § 271(e)(1) protects.145
In Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., pursuant to a
Food and Drug Administration Investigational Device Exemption, Ventritex
began clinical trials of its implantable defibrillator.146 The Investigational
Device Exemption enabled it to sell its device at cost for patient implantation
to gather data that the FDA required for market approval. Ventritex also
demonstrated its device to physicians and non-physicians at medical confer-
ences and described its clinical trial results to investors, analysts, and journal-
ists. Telectronics sued, asserting that the Ventritex's activities exceeded the
§ 217(e)(1) exemption, and sought a declaratory judgment of infringement
upon the expiration of the exemption. The district court dismissed, and the
appeals court affirmed, noting that § 271(a) of the Patent Act "clearly speci-
fies only the making, using or selling of a patented invention as infringing
activities."I47 Under § 271(e)(1), these potentially infringing activities are
exempt if performed solely for uses reasonably related to the development of
information for FDA approval."148 The Federal Circuit, approving the analy-
sis in Intermedics, held that the § 271(e)(1) exemption is not lost because a
party, who has made no use of the patented invention other than for FDA-
related data gathering, disseminates the data for business and fund-raising
purposes.149
142. Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269, 1277-78 (N.D. Cal.
1991), aff'd, 991 F.2d 808 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
143. Id. at 1273 (emphasis in original).
144. Id. at 1278.
145. Id. at 1290.
146. Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d 1520 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
147. Id. at 1523.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1525.
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In Farmaceutisk Laboratorium Ferring A/S v. Solvay Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., the Northern District of Georgia held that a defendant accused of in-
fringement may pursue a declaratory judgment counterclaim as to patent in-
validity, but not as to noninfringement, because the defendant's current
clinical testing uses of plaintiff's patented disease treatment method were
protected from an infringement claim by § 271(e)(1).i50
In Infinitech, Inc. v. Vitrophage, Inc., the Northern Indiana District
Court upheld a potential infringer's declaratory judgment action on validity
even though the patentee conceded that the plaintiff's current activities were
exempt under § 271(e)(1).151 "When the declaratory plaintiff is a patent
holder seeking a ruling of infringement against a product still in clinical test-
ing, the purposes of the Act and of Section 271(e)(1) are not undermined by
holding that jurisdiction does not attach until after the allegedly infringing
product moves beyond clinical testing."52 This case is also notable for up-
holding jurisdiction over the case under the reasonable-apprehension-of-suit
standard then in effect.153
In Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., Abtox had a patent on a device for
sterilizing medical instruments.154 Exitron argued that the use of its version
of the device was exempt from infringement under § 271(e)(1) because it
was using the class II medical device in order to obtain FDA approval. How-
ever, Abtox argued that Exitron's use did not fall within the scope of
§ 271(e)(1) because class II medical devices are not eligible for patent term
extensions. The court upheld the broad holding of Eli Lilly, agreeing that
"section 271(e)(1) applies to any use reasonably related to regulation under
the FDCA."55 The device before the Supreme Court in Eli Lilly was a class
III medical device, a type of device which is eligible for patent term exten-
sion and premarketing approval requirements.156 The Federal Circuit further
broadened the scope of § 271(e)(1) by holding that although class II medical
devices are not eligible for patent term extension, they are nonetheless sub-
ject to the § 271(e)(1) exception.157
150. Farmaceutisk Laboratorium Ferring A/S v. Solvay Pharm., Inc., 25 U.S.P.Q. 2d
1344, 1353 (N.D. Ga. 1992).
151. Infinitech, Inc. v. Vitrophage, Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1201 (N.D. Ind. 1994).
152. Id. at 1205.
153. See Infinitech, Inc. v. Vitrophage, Inc., 842 F. Supp. 332, 337-38 (N.D. Ill.
1994).
154. Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1020-21 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
155. See id. at 1028; see also Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 664
(1990).
156. Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 670; see also 35 U.S.C. 156 (2000).
157. See Abtox, 122 F.3d at 1028-29.
2009] 37
SMU Science and Technology Law Review
e. Experimental or De Minimis Uses with Commercialism Infringes
In Embrex, Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp., Embrex owned a patent
on a method for inoculating birds against disease by injecting vaccines into a
specified region of the egg before hatching.158 Service Engineering unsuc-
cessfully attempted to design around the Embrex patent by building an injec-
tion machine outside the patent and hiring two scientists to investigate the
possibility of injecting chicken embryos outside the region of the egg cov-
ered by the patent. Even with this patent-law-savvy experimental approach,
the activities were found to infringe because injecting the eggs with a vaccine
was done expressly for commercial purposes and therefore was not experi-
mental use nor de minimis.159 Furthermore, even though Service Engineering
did not sell any injection machines or commercially practice the patented
method, the court did not allow the exemption.160 Judge Rader's concurring
opinion expressed his view that the Patent Act "leaves no leeway to excuse
infringement because the infringer only infringed a little."'61 Since Judge
Rader had defined experimental use as a plea based on the "intent" of the
infringing activity, he concluded that recent cases had eliminated the experi-
mental use exemption completely, even in the instances of noncommercial
and idle curiosity uses.162
f. Broad Reach of 271(e)(1) Continues To Be Found
In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc, the Southern
District Court of New York expanded the scope of § 271(e)(1) to include
patented research tools used in the course of developing drugs for clinical
trials ultimately intended for FDA approval.163 The court further noted that
the activity need only be likely to generate information relevant to an FDA
filing, even if this information is never actually used to obtain FDA
approval. 64
In Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation v. Genentech, Inc., the
Scripps Clinic owned patents on a method of preparing the agent Factor
VIII:C by purifying and concentrating human or porcine blood plasma.165
The Northern District of California noted that the legislative history of the
158. Embrex, Inc. v. Service Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
159. Id. at 1349.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1353 (Radar, J., concurring) (citing Deuterium, 19 Cl. Ct. at 631.
162. Id.
163. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19361, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2001).
164. Id.
165. Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 1379, 1383
(N.D. Cal. 1987).
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statute indicated that the only acceptable use of the patented invention under
§ 271(e)(1) is bioequivalency testing for FDA approval.166 The court pointed
out that Genentech's use of the protein was not solely for the purpose of
development and submission of information to the FDA but Genentech also
used the protein to develop a more efficient and less costly manufacturing
process and to obtain a foreign patent.167 This narrow interpretation of the
scope of § 271(e)(1) continued in Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Smith,
where the district court held that § 271(e)(1) was limited "to permitting ge-
neric manufacturers to establish the bioequivalency of generic drugs" and did
not permit any other collateral uses such as using the FDA data to promote or
market the product.168 This narrow interpretation of § 271(e)(1) uses was
unpopular among other courts and lasted a brief period of time.
In Intermedics v. Ventritex, Ventritex used the clinical trial data ob-
tained under the protection of § 271(e)(1) to solicit money to fund further
clinical trials after the patent term expired; Ventritex also used this data to
obtain patent rights in other countries.169 The court noted that an otherwise
infringing activity is exempt if:
It [would] have been reasonable, objectively, for a party in defen-
dant's situation to believe that there was a decent prospect that the
"use" in question would contribute (relatively directly) to the gen-
eration of kinds of information that was likely to be relevant in the
processes by which the FDA would decide whether to approve the
product[.] 170
Thus, the court held Ventritex's uses did not infringe, and the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, suggesting that Congress in-
tended that § 271(e)(1) be used to shelter all products seeking FDA approval,
regardless of their projected commercialization date.171
IX. MADEY-No COMMON LAW EXPERIMENTAL USE EXEMPTION
FOR UNIVERSITIES
In Madey v. Duke University, Madey was a tenured faculty member and
director of a physics research laboratory at Duke University and owned a
patent on a free-electron laser (FEL) oscillator which was used as a spectros-
copy research tool.172 After Madey left his position, Duke continued to use
166. Id. at 1396.
167. Id.
168. Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 18 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1977, 1992 (E.D. Penn. 1990).
169. Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
170. Id. at 1280.
171. Intermedics, 26 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1528.
172. Madey v. Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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the FEL oscillator.173 Madey sued Duke for patent infringement and Duke
defended, claiming that its use of the FEL oscillator was an experimental
use.174 The district court agreed with Duke and held that the experimental
use defense covered uses "solely for research, academic, or experimental
purposes."75 But on appeal, the Federal Circuit held that the district court's
definition of experimental use was too broad and stated that any use which
has the "slightest commercial implication" or is "in keeping with the legiti-
mate business of the alleged infringer" cannot qualify for the experimental
use defense.176 Duke's nonprofit status did not persuade the court, but rather
Duke's use unmistakably furthered Duke's "legitimate business objectives"
which included "educating and enlightening students and faculty" and en-
hancing the status of the university; therefore Duke's use of the FEL oscilla-
tor did not fall within the experimental use exemption.177
Almost 200 years after Whittemore, a simple straight forward commer-
cialism argument is still being used to defeat an experimental use argument.
Today, colleges and universities are permitted to be patent machines, gener-
ate enormous income, and profit from patent ownership.178 If the Roche
holding is allowed to stand, research will be hindered. If there is no safe way
to experiment on patented inventions, it will be the sole domain of the origi-
nal patentee to make improvements on the original invention. The original
patentee may have a right to equivalents and obvious enhancements to their
invention, but not a monopoly on all future improvements.
X. INTEGRA-271(E)(1) BROAD ENOUGH TO INCLUDE COMMERCIAL
EXPERIMENTAL USES
Recently, in Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, Integra had
several patents on a pharmacologically useful "short tri-peptide segment of
fibronectin" with the amino acid sequence Arg-Gly-Arg, known as the RGD
peptide.179 Merck hired Dr. David Cheresh, a scientist at Scripps Research
Institute, to investigate compounds with the same receptor blocking capabil-
ity as the RGD peptides.so Eventually, Integra offered to license their pat-
173. Id. at 1353.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1355.
176. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1361-62.
177. Id.
178. Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, H.R. 6933, P.L. No. 96-517 (1980) (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2000)) (allows universities and other non-
profit institutions to retain ownership of patents from federally-funded
research).
179. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 862 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
180. Id. at 863.
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ents to Merck but Merck ultimately declined the offer; subsequently, Integra
sued Merck, Scripps, and Dr. Cheresh for patent infringement.18, Merck
claimed that its use of the RGD peptides in preclinical studies was exempt as
within the scope of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).182 The district court held that the
§ 271(e)(1) exemption failed to cover the work performed for Merck at
Scripps because it was not objectively reasonable that this work would be
relevant to FDA approval.183
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's holding on the ground
that the § 271(e)(1) safe harbor did not apply because "the Scripps work
sponsored by Merck was not clinical testing to supply information to the
FDA, but only general biomedical research to identify new pharmaceutical
compounds."184 Most notable, however, is Judge Newman's dissenting opin-
ion where she indicates that she would have found that Merck did not com-
mit infringement because its activities were either within the common law
experimental use exception or were immunized by § 271(e)(1).185 Newman
stated that allowing this type of experimental research "is essential to the
creation of new knowledge" and therefore is essential to promoting "scien-
tific and technologic progress."86 Perhaps the Newman approach signaled a
return to a broad experimental use exemption that is not tied to FDA
activities.
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Federal Circuit's deci-
sion, commenting that "as an initial matter, we think it apparent from the
statutory text that § 271(e)(1)'s exemption from infringement extends to all
uses of patented inventions that are reasonably related to the development
and submission of any information under the FDCA."87 According to the
Supreme Court, "[t]his [information] necessarily includes preclinical studies
of patented compounds that are appropriate for submission to the FDA in the
regulatory process."188 To construe § 271(e)(1) as the Federal Circuit did "is
effectively to limit assurance of exemption to the activities necessary to seek
approval of a generic drug."189
The Integra decision had a very different outcome from Madey, possi-
bly because Integra interpreted a statutorily defined experimental exemption
in conjunction with nearly two decades of case law. Commercial uses were
contemplated by the legislature when § 271(e)(1) was enacted and courts
181. Id.
182. Id. at 86.
183. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 200 (2005).
184. Integra, 331 F.3d at 866.
185. Id. at 878 (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
186. Id. at 876.
187. Merck, 545 U.S. at 202.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 206.
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have read § 271(e)(1) as broadly as written, to allow for products and uses
not originally contemplated to be more acceptable in the scientific industry.
On the other hand, universities lack statutorily defined experimental exemp-
tions in patent law. Also lacking is extensive case law dealing specifically
with universities and common law experimental exemptions. Therefore, de-
spite their non-profit status, universities must be characterized as a commer-
cial entity and analyzed using common law experimental use case law for
other commercial entities.
Historically, common law experimental use was rarely accepted as a
defense to patent infringement. Until recently, even statutorily defined in-
dustry specific experimental exemptions had to overcome a strong bias
against commercialism, making the experimental defense invalid. The ex-
perimental hands of universities and non-profit research organizations can
only be untied if they are provided with statutorily defined experimental ex-
emptions in patent law. Once non-profit and universities experimental ex-
emptions are provided, they must be narrowed and broadened in court to
determine the acceptable commercial uses that can still be deemed as
experimental.
XI. CONCLUSION
The holdings of Integra and Madey can be explained by an historical
analysis of the experimental use as a defense or an exemption to patent in-
fringement. Experimental use of a patented invention was initially limited to
non-profit uses not in the regular course of business, for amusement, or to
satisfy idle curiosity. Before 271(e)(1) and the holding in Integra, courts
rarely allowed the common law experimental use defense to include com-
mercial, for-profit uses. The Madey holding can be read as redefining a non-
profit organization's activities as commercial and then rejecting the experi-
mental use defense under common law. The Integra holding can be read as
allowing commercial experimental use for FDA approval as provided by
statute.
Does the experimental use defense to patent infringement still exist to-
day? The answer is both yes and no. No, in terms of common law experi-
mental use, which case history has shown that courts are reluctant to apply.
Yes, in terms of well-defined, industry-specific experimental use exemptions
defined by statute. Moving forward, it will be necessary for other industries,
such as universities and non-profit research organizations, to lobby for stat-
utes that specifically define experimental exemptions.
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